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A Weighty Issue: Will Pharmacists Survive the FenPhen Feeding Frenzy? Kohl v. American Home
Products Corporation and a Pharmacist’s Duty to
Warn of the Dangers of Prescription Drugs
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, pharmacists dispensed over 18 million prescriptions for
fenfluramine in the United States.1 As the more dangerous half of
the diet drug combination popularly known as “Fen-Phen,”
fenfluramine promised overweight Americans something that seemed
too good to be true: the body of their dreams as excess flab melted
away without hunger.2
The honeymoon, however, was short-lived. Americans’ love affair
with Fen-Phen came to a bitter end when, in July of 1997, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) published a report linking
valvular heart disease to the use of Fen-Phen.3 On September 15,
1. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cardiac Valvulopathy Associated
with Exposure to Fenfluramine or Dexfenfluramine: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Interim Public Health Recommendations, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.,
Nov. 1997.
Fenfluramine was marketed under the trade name “Pondium.” See U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., FDA Announces Withdrawal of Fenfluramine and DexFenfluramine, HHS
NEWS, Sept. 15, 1997. Dexfenfluramine, which will be treated the same as fenfluramine for the
purposes of this Note, was marketed under the trade name “Redux.” See id.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania estimates that from
January 1995 to September 1997 approximately 6,000,000 people ingested some form of
fenfluramine. In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000).
2. Fen-Phen affects seratonin levels in the brain to trick the body into feeling full. See
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 1. Fen-Phen was such an effective
appetite suppressant that one patient reported having to “force” herself to eat. See Cable News
Network Interactive, Dieters rah-rah over Fen-Phen, at http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/
9612/17/fen.phen/ (Dec. 17, 1996).
3. See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Reports of Valvular Heart Disease in Patients
Receiving Concomitant Fenfluramine and Phentermine, 27 FDA MED. BULL., July 8, 1997.
The report featured thirty-three cases in which patients who were taking Fen-Phen were found
to have valvular irregularities. See id. Nearly all of the patients were diagnosed with valvular
heart disease. See id. About half of the patients also were diagnosed with pulmonary
hypertension. See id. All of the patients were women between the ages of thirty-five and
seventy-two who had been taking Fen-Phen for between one and sixteen months. See id.
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1997, the FDA announced the withdrawal of fenfluramine from the
market.4 Sales ground to a halt,5 stock plummeted,6 and thousands
of Fen-Phen consumers lined up at their doctor’s offices for
echocardiograms.7
No one was surprised8 when these same consumers found their
way en masse into lawyers’ offices around the country as a wave of
litigation ensued. As of May 2000, “approximately 18,000
individuals” had filed lawsuits against American Home Products, the
maker of fenfluramine.9 Although a federal judge recently approved a
$3.75 billion class action settlement against American Home
Products,10 44,423 plaintiffs exercised their right to opt out,11
thousands more are challenging the settlement as unfair,12 and many
more cases remain pending in state court.13
As the unwitting middlemen caught in a litigation feeding
frenzy, pharmacists and the future of their profession are on shaky
ground.14 While courts traditionally have held pharmacists to a duty
4. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1.
5. American Home Products, the manufacturer of fenfluramine, grossed $191 million
in fenfluramine sales in 1996 alone. See Cable News Network Interactive, Too good to be true?
Critics warn of Fen-Phen side effects, at http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9612/20/
fen.phen4/ (Dec. 20, 1996).
6. The same day that the FDA announced the withdrawal of fenfluramine, American
Home Products
issued a press release estimating total lost profits of 14 cents per share for 1997 and
1998 . . . as well as a one-time product withdrawal loss of $200 million to $300
million. On September 15, the day of the withdrawal announcement, the closing
price of AHP common stock fell 3 11/16 points, to 73 1/4.
See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2000).
7. When the FDA announced the withdrawal of fenfluramine, it advised patients who
had used the drug to “contact their doctors to discuss their treatment.” U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., supra note 1. An echocardiogram is a “special procedure that can test the
functioning of heart valves.” Id.
8. Least of all American Home Products, who grimly announced the day after the FDA
announcement that it would “likely . . . face legal action.” Oran, 226 F.3d at 280.
9. In re Diet Drugs, No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *9 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2000).
10. See id.
11. Shannon P. Duffy, $3.75 Billion Fen-Phen Settlement Approved, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 29, 2000.
12. See In re Diet Drugs, No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
28, 2000).
13. See Duffy, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889 (W.D. Ark.
1999) (recognizing that “[t]he issue of whether a cause of action may be maintained against a
retail pharmacy for filling a physician’s prescription has been the subject of debate in both the
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of clerical accuracy only, some courts recently have shown a
willingness to extend this duty to include the duty to warn of the
dangers of prescription drugs.15
Kohl v. American Home Products Corporation, the principal case
in this Note, purported to apply the traditional rule but nevertheless
suggested that a pharmacist could be held liable for failing to
second-guess labeling information supplied by the manufacturer of
fenfluramine.16 While the holding itself is unimportant (the court
eventually dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on procedural grounds),
the court’s rationale is significant because it further muddied the
waters of pharmacists’ liability. More importantly, as the Kohl court
was the only judicial body in the country to address squarely the
issue of a pharmacist’s duty to warn of the dangers of Fen-Phen,
other courts will likely look to the Kohl rationale as the Fen-Phen
litigation filters down into the state courts.
Part II of this Note gives a brief synopsis of the Fen-Phen
controversy and traces the recent judicial history of pharmacists’
liability. Part III gives the facts of Kohl and explains the court’s
reasoning in suggesting that a pharmacist could be held liable for
failure to warn of the dangers of fenfluramine. Part IV analyzes the
court’s opinion, compares that opinion with other recent decisions
involving a pharmacist’s duty to warn, and argues that the court
improperly expanded and confused the scope of pharmacists’
liability. Furthermore, this Note concludes that the modern trend
toward expanding pharmacists’ liability could displace the physician’s
role and thereby compromise patient care.
II.

BACKGROUND

Fenfluramine leapt from relative obscurity in 1992 to become
one of the hottest selling diet drugs of the century.17 Sales were brisk
case law and in the academic field.”).
15. See, e.g., Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1134
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
16. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 893. Although the court couched such a duty as a duty
to “properly label . . . prescriptions,” the Kohl court nevertheless suggested that pharmacists
should have “labeled” fenfluramine with warnings that had yet to be disclosed by the FDA. See
id. While it is useful to distinguish between “warnings” and “labeling” in some contexts, this
Note suggests that the duty to warn and the duty to label are indistinguishable when the
pharmacist did not know and had no reason to know of the dangers at issue.
17. See In re Diet Drugs, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *5. This sales phenomenon
is generally attributed to Michael Weintraub, M.D., who “advocated the use of Fenfluramine
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until reports surfaced in 1997 linking fenfluramine to heart disease.18
Although the Mayo Clinic suspected an association between the use
of fenfluramine and valvular heart disease in March 1997, the FDA
did not make those findings public until July 8, 1997.19 When the
FDA did issue a public warning about the use of fenfluramine, it
pointed out that the evidence linking fenfluramine to heart disease
was not yet conclusive.20 The FDA did not officially withdraw
fenfluramine from the market until September 15, 1997, over two
months after the initial reports were made public.21
Most of the 18,000 plaintiffs that filed lawsuits against American
Home Products claimed the manufacturer either knew or should
have known of the adverse effects of fenfluramine well before the
FDA’s official withdrawal of the drug.22 Likewise, the Kohl plaintiff
alleged that the defendant pharmacy either knew or should have
known of the dangerous defects of fenfluramine even before the
FDA’s announcement.23 While courts have been receptive to such
claims against drug manufacturers,24 courts have traditionally
declined to impose such a duty to warn on individual pharmacists.25
The sections below outline the doctrines and rationales
supporting the traditional rule that pharmacists have no duty to warn
and contrasts those rules with the modern view that a pharmacist’s
duty extends beyond clerical accuracy.26
combined with phentermine.” Id. Weintraub believed the combination lessened the adverse
side effects “associated with using Fenfluramine alone,” and thus “Fen-Phen” was born. Id.
18. See id. at *7.
19. See id. The Mayo Clinic did not officially publish its results until August 28, 1997.
See id.
20. See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., supra note 3.
21. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1.
22. See In re Diet Drugs, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *185–86.
23. Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891–92 (W.D. Ark. 1999).
24. Last year a federal judge approved a $3.75 billion settlement against American
Home Products. In re Diet Drugs, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *214. That settlement
was affirmed by the Third Circuit in an unpublished opinion on August 15, 2001. See The
Fen-Phen e-Resource, 3rd Circuit Clears Up Final Obstacle to National Settlement, at
http://www.fen-phen-eresource.com/ third.cfm (August 17, 2001).
25. See, e.g., Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1991).
26. The duty of clerical accuracy requires the pharmacist to dispense “the intended
medication free of contamination from improper storage, and [to supply] correct and complete
directions.” Lauren Fleischer, Note, From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists’
Standard of Care in Negligence Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 174 (1999) (citing David B.
Brushwood, The Pharmacist’s Duty Under OBRA-90 Standards, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 475
(1997)).
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A.

Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs and Strict Liability

This is not the first time that the dangerous effects of a
prescription drug were discovered only after the drug was ingested
by millions of consumers, and it will not be the last.27 The
competing interests of promoting useful medical innovations and
protecting the public against dangerous products have led the
American Law Institute to propose that prescription drugs should be
excepted from the strict liability provision of the Restatement of
Torts.28 Many states have adopted the § 402A comment k exception
to strict liability for prescription drugs under the view that all
prescription medications are unavoidably unsafe.29 In a further effort
to protect prescription drugs, the Utah legislature declared that
FDA-approved drugs are presumed to be free from defects as a
matter of law.30
However, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the
protections of comment k apply only when the plaintiff alleges a
design defect.31 Thus, only prescription drugs that are “properly
prepared and accompanied by warnings of [their] dangerous
propensities” will be sheltered under comment k.32 Because of the
above protections, most plaintiffs recognize that they face an uphill
battle in proving a drug was sold in an unreasonably dangerous
condition due to a defective design. Some plaintiffs, therefore, allege
the product was rendered unreasonably dangerous by the
27. For similar problems with the prescription drugs Bendectin and DES, see,
respectively, Johnson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., C.A. No. 83-3814, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24662 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 1984), and Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 710 P.2d 247 (Cal.
1985). This Note analyzes pharmacists’ liability in light of Fen-Phen because it is the most
recent and relevant example of mass tort liability in the field of prescription drugs.
28. Comment k of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) provides:
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because
of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as
there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk.
Id.
29. See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 93–94 (Utah 1991) (citing
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482 (Cal.1988)).
30. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (2000). Plaintiffs may overcome this rebuttable
presumption. See id.
31. See, e.g., Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 91.
32. Id. at 92. The court recognized that “[t]his limitation on the scope of comment k
immunity is universally recognized.” Id.
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pharmacist’s failure to warn.33
Although Utah courts have yet to address the issue, such strict
liability claims have been largely unsuccessful in other jurisdictions.34
In support of these holdings, courts have recognized that subjecting
pharmacists to strict liability would hardly serve the purposes of such
a standard; namely, to provide an incentive for issuing safer products,
“for the pharmacist presented with a prescription ordered by a duly
licensed physician is not at liberty to substitute his judgment of the
product’s safety for the patient for that of the physician.”35
In addition, courts have found that subjecting pharmacists to
strict liability would produce untenable practical ramifications;
namely, that such liability would impose on pharmacists the
obligation to independently test new prescription drugs, thereby
making them the “absolute insurer” of the products.36 Courts also
have speculated that, to avoid liability, pharmacists might even
“refuse to fill prescriptions, notwithstanding decisions by licensed
physicians that a particular drug was necessary and appropriate for
their patients’ medical treatment.”37 Such a cost to society, courts
have concluded, would be “unduly high.”38
More importantly, courts have pointed out that even a
manufacturer’s duty to warn does not extend to individual
consumers, but only to prescribing physicians.39 Thus, if drug
manufacturers complied with their duty to warn physicians of
dangerous side effects, the drug product as shipped to the pharmacy
could not be considered unreasonably dangerous due to a defective
33. See Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 710 P.2d 247, 249 (Cal. 1985) (involving claim
that pharmacist should be held strictly liable for failure to warn of the dangerous defects of
DES); Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (same claim involving
feldene); Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (same
claim involving Bendectin).
34. See, e.g., Ramirez, 628 F. Supp. at 87 (listing courts that have “consistently rejected
the application of strict liability to pharmacists.”).
35. Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 895 (W.D. Ark. 1999)
(quoting Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1991)).
36. Id.; see also Bichler v. Willing, 397 N.Y.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (refusing to hold
pharmacist strictly liable for failure to warn of the hazardous effects of DES). For a similar
rationale applied to drug manufacturers, see also Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, (Cal.
1988) (declining to impose strict liability on drug manufacturers because such a rule would not
comport with the traditional goals of tort law, namely, deterrence and cost distribution).
37. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (quoting Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387).
38. Ramirez, 628 F. Supp. at 87.
39. See Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Ramirez v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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warning.40 In order for the plaintiff to prevail in such a case, a court
“would have to conclude that the product somehow became
unreasonably dangerous in [the pharmacy’s] hands.”41 Such a
conclusion, one court noted, would be “unreasonable.”42 Therefore,
the majority of courts have declined to impose a more stringent duty
to warn on pharmacists than that imposed on manufacturers.43
The common thread in the above arguments is that the duty to
warn individual patients of the potential hazards of prescription
drugs properly lies with the physician—not the pharmacist, or even
the manufacturer. This traditional view finds its rationale in the
“learned intermediary doctrine,” discussed next.
B.

The Learned Intermediary Doctrine

The learned intermediary rule, as described in Coyle v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., posits that the physician is the person who
can best evaluate and explain the dangers of prescription drugs “to
the patient in the context of his or her individual medical
circumstances.”44 The Coyle court noted that “[p]hysicians exercising
sound medical judgment act as intermediaries in the chain of
distribution, preempting, as it were, the exercise of discretion by the
supplier-pharmacist, and, within limits, by the patient-consumer.”45
In keeping with the justification for strict liability, courts point
out that it is not the pharmacist on whom the public is “forced to
rely” for prescription drugs, but rather the physician.46 Thus, courts
are reluctant to impose any rule that would shift this reliance from
the physician to the pharmacist because of the destructive effect it
would have on the physician-patient relationship.47 In the
prescription drugs context, courts realize that pharmacists’
40. See Leesley, 518 N.E.2d at 761.
41. Id. at 761–62.
42. Id. at 762; see also Ramirez, 628 F. Supp. at 87 (finding that “[i]t would be illogical
and unreasonable . . . to impose a greater duty on the pharmacist . . . than is imposed on the
manufacturer”); Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1386 (reasoning that “[i]f the manufacturer has no duty to
directly warn patients of the risks of drugs, it would indeed be incongruous to hold
pharmacists to such a duty in the dispensing of drugs”).
43. See, e.g., id.
44. Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1386.
45. Id.
46. Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 895 (W.D. Ark. 1999)
(quoting Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387).
47. See, e.g., Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387.
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interaction with patients comes only after the patient has obtained a
signed prescription from the physician, during which time the
dangers of the drug would presumably have already been discussed.
Therefore, requiring the pharmacist to supplement the physician’s
warnings with his own would “have the effect of undermining the
physician-patient relationship by engendering fear, doubt, and
second-guessing.”48 In such a scenario,
the patient-consumer would be receiving information about the
risks of medication, information he or she would likely be unable to
properly assess and weigh, from someone unfamiliar with the
patient’s medical condition, after those risks had already been
weighed by a physician having specific knowledge of the patient’s
medical needs.49

In short, these courts believe such a rule would significantly
jeopardize the standard of health care in this country.50
C.

Negligence

Under the rationale of the learned intermediary doctrine, most, if
not all, courts have declined to impose a strict liability duty to warn
on pharmacists.51 And while most courts apply the learned
intermediary rule with equal force to negligence,52 the modern
view—that pharmacists should be required to do more than merely
follow physicians’ orders—appears to be gaining acceptance. Thus,
the real controversy lies in how courts apply (or decline to apply) the
learned intermediary rule to negligence cases.53

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The rationale of the learned intermediary doctrine is widely accepted. See, e.g.,
Griffith v. Blatt, 973 P.2d 385, 389–90 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). The Griffith court noted that
many jurisdictions that have considered “whether pharmacists should be strictly liable for
failure to warn of a prescription drug’s dangerous propensities” have invoked the “learned
intermediary” doctrine and, “apparently without exception, have refused to impose such
liability.” Id.
51. See id.
52. See Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 760–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (noting that
“[i]n cases adopting the [learned intermediary] doctrine, the courts have applied it as
frequently to negligence claims as to strict liability actions”).
53. To date, no Utah court has ever ruled on this issue.
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1. The traditional view
Under the traditional view, courts rely heavily on the learned
intermediary rule. This view encourages the manufacturer, physician,
and pharmacist to remain in their respective traditional roles.
Accordingly, the manufacturer will provide adequate warnings to the
physician, the physician will relay the warnings to the patient in the
context of individual medical circumstances, and the pharmacist will
fill the prescription according to the physician’s instructions.54 Under
the traditional view, any deviation from these roles will jeopardize
the standard of patient care.55
Thus, the traditionalists would limit a pharmacist’s duty to
“clerical accuracy.”56 While the modern view takes issue with
denigrating the pharmacist’s role to that of a mere “pill-counter,”
the traditionalists are quick to point out that the “clerical accuracy”
rule is subject to some limitations. For example, pharmacists are
responsible for spotting clear or patent errors, such as “obvious lethal
dosages, inadequacies in the instructions, known contraindications,
or incompatible prescriptions.”57
Advocates of the traditional view also point to the practical
implications of imposing a duty to warn on pharmacists. Because
some drugs are shipped in bulk from the manufacturer to the
pharmacist, each shipment contains only one package insert or
warning. Thus, requiring pharmacists to reproduce the warning and
give it to patients with every prescription filled would be unduly
burdensome and unreasonable.58 Moreover, federal statutory law
specifically exempts prescription drugs from the package labeling
requirements reserved for over-the-counter drugs.59 Turning again to
54. See, e.g., Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that “there exists no legal duty on the part of a pharmacist to monitor and intervene with a
customer’s reliance on drugs prescribed by a licensed treating physician”).
55. See supra Part II.B.
56. Adkins, 425 N.W.2d at 152. For a definition of clerical accuracy, see supra note 26.
See also Dora A. Gonzalez, Note and Comment, A Prescription for Litigation: In Pursuit of the
Pharmacists’ “Duty to Warn” of the Adverse Effects of Prescription Drugs, 1 J. LEGAL ADVOC. &
PRAC. 53, 54 (1999) (finding that “the traditional, and still majority position . . . holds that a
pharmacist has no duty to warn”).
57. McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1053 (Wash. 1989); See also
Nichols v. Central Merchandise, Inc., 817 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); Riff v.
Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
58. See Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
59. See McKee, 782 P.2d at 1054 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2)).
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the learned intermediary rule, courts assert that it makes much more
sense for the physician to provide such warnings in the context of the
patient’s individual medical circumstances.60
2. The modern view
In contrast to the traditional view, the modern view asserts that
“pharmacists are trained professionals” and argues that, in some
cases, pharmacists should be required to do more than
“unquestionably obey the written orders [of] . . . physicians.”61
Specifically, the modern view takes offense at the learned
intermediary rule’s hesitation to vest pharmacists with any
independent judgment and posits that, at least in some
circumstances, pharmacists have a duty to warn consumers of the
potential hazards of prescription drugs.62
a. State statutory provisions. Some courts have found justification
for requiring pharmacists to exercise independent judgment in state
statutory provisions.63 The Utah Pharmacy Practice Act includes the
following provisions under “Practice of Pharmacy”: “(a) interpreting
prescription orders; . . . [and] (f) providing information on drugs or
devices, which may include advice relating to therapeutic values,
potential hazards, and uses; . . . (i) providing patient counseling,
including adverse and therapeutic effects of drugs.”64
In perhaps the most liberal interpretation of a pharmacy statute,
one court relied on the state pharmacy act to find not only that the
pharmacist should have exercised his independent judgment over the
physician’s, but that, as between a physician and a pharmacist,
“[e]ach has an affirmative duty to be, to a limited extent, his
brother’s keeper.”65
60. See id.
61. Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891 (W.D. Ark. 1999)
(quoting Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
62. See Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994).
63. See, e.g., Riff, 508 A.2d at 1251.
64. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-17a-102(43) (1999). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2002
(1986); WASH. REV. CODE. § 18.64.011(11) (1989).
65. Riff, 508 A.2d at 1253. However, in this case the court found the pharmacist had a
duty to exercise his independent judgment over the physician’s in part because the instructions
were patently inadequate. See id. Although this outcome could lend itself to the traditional
view of the “limited duty” to detect patent errors, see supra Part II.C.1, the case is included
here to show that some courts look to state statutory provisions to define a pharmacist’s duty
of care.
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Although another court refused to use the state pharmacy act to
define a pharmacist’s duty, it did so in part because the act was not
in effect at the time the pharmacist filled the prescription in question.
Therefore, the court in Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.66 left open
the possibility of applying the statute to define a pharmacist’s duty at
a later date.67
The traditionalists respond to these arguments by asserting that
state statutory pharmaceutical provisions are definitional only, and
do “not purport to set forth duties.”68 In specifically addressing
whether, as the plaintiff alleged, the pharmacist must advise of the
“therapeutic values, hazards, and the uses of drugs and devices,”69
the McKee court concluded that the statutory language did not
impose “a mandatory duty on all pharmacists to warn customers of
all dangers associated with a drug.”70 Rather, the court construed the
language to apply only where pharmacists possessed “prescriptive
authority.”71
b. Standard of care vs. duty. At least one court rejected the
traditional rule by laboring to distinguish “duty” from “standard of
care.”72 Although its line of reasoning was somewhat unclear, the
Arizona Court of Appeals concluded without discussion that the
66. 643 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C 1986).
67. Raynor, 643 F. Supp. at 246 (holding that “[t]he [c]ourt makes no determination
whether § 2-2002 imposes an actionable duty on pharmacies”).
68. McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Wash. 1989); For
purposes of comparison with the Utah Pharmacy Practice Act, the relevant provisions of the
Washington Act are set out below:
“Practice of Pharmacy” includes the practice of and responsibility for: Interpreting
prescription orders; the compounding, dispensing, labeling, administering, and
distributing of drugs and devices; the monitoring of drug therapy and use; the
initiating or modifying of drug therapy in accordance with written guidelines or
protocols previously established and approved for his or her practice by a
practitioner authorized to prescribe drugs; the participating in drug utilization
reviews and drug product selection; the proper and safe storing and distributing of
drugs and devices and maintenance of proper records thereof; the providing of
information on legend drugs which may include, but is not limited to, the advising
of therapeutic values, hazards, and the uses of drugs and devices.
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.64.011(11).
69. McKee, 782 P.2d at 1051–52 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 18.64.011(11)).
70. Id. at 1052.
71. Id.
72. Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994). Moreover, the court announced that the fatal mistake of courts following the
traditional rule was that “they use details of the standard of conduct to determine whether a
duty exists.” Id.
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pharmacist could have breached its duty to the patient.73 The court
noted that determining whether the pharmacist breached that duty
required the trier of fact74 to examine the standard of care for
pharmacists. To determine the standard of care, the court relied on
an expert affidavit that imposed a duty on pharmacists to “advise a
customer of the addictive nature of a drug, to warn of the hazards of
ingesting two or more drugs that adversely interact with one
another, and to discuss with the physician the addictive nature of a
prescribed drug and the dangers of long-term prescription of the
drug.”75 Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the pharmacist.76
At most, the Lasley case suggests that pharmacists will always
have a duty to warn their patients. Furthermore, the case stands for
the proposition that whether or not a pharmacist breached the
standard of care can be determined by any number of criteria,
including expert witnesses77 and standards enunciated by the
American Pharmaceutical Association.78
Unlike the Lasley court, the Kohl court declined to distinguish
“duty” from “standard of care.” Nevertheless, the Kohl court
reached a similar result by suggesting that the defendant pharmacists
could be held liable in negligence.79 Although the two courts took
different paths to reach the same result, both can be seen as
expanding the scope of pharmacists’ liability.
III. KOHL V. AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS, INC.
A.

Facts

Patricia Ann Kohl began taking fenfluramine as prescribed by her
physician in May of 1996. Although the record is unclear as to how
long she took the drug, Kohl filed suit against the manufacturers of
fenfluramine80 as well as Sims Drug and Clinic Pharmacy on October
73. See id. at 1134.
74. See id. (concluding that, in considering “whether a failure to warn violates the
applicable standard of conduct,” summary judgment is generally inappropriate).
75. Id. at 1134.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 893 (W.D. Ark. 1999).
80. Kohl filed suit against manufacturers American Home Products Corp., Wyeth-
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8, 1999. Kohl “allege[d] she contracted valvular heart disease . . . as
a result of taking [the] diet drugs.”81
The manufacturers sought to have the case transferred to the
consolidated pretrial proceedings for the multi-district class action
against American Home Products.82 In response, the plaintiff moved
to remand to state court on the grounds that the pharmacies, both
Arkansas citizens, destroyed diversity of citizenship.83 The defendants
maintained that the pharmacies were fraudulently joined and asked
the district court to stay the proceedings pending transfer to the class
action.84
In order to rule on whether the defendant pharmacies were
fraudulently joined, the court had to examine the merits of Kohl’s
claims, specifically whether strict liability and negligence were valid
causes of action against the pharmacies.85 After examining the
reasoning behind both the traditional and modern views of
pharmacist liability, the court ruled that the strict liability claim
against the defendant pharmacists was not cognizable, but that the
negligence claim was valid.86 The court’s reasoning for these
conclusions is set out below.
B. The Court’s Reasoning
1. Strict liability
In finding that the defendant pharmacists could not be held
strictly liable for failure to warn the plaintiff of the potential hazards
of fenfluramine, the court addressed two theories: (1) both public
policy and the learned intermediary rule prohibit application of strict
liability to pharmacists, and (2) plaintiff’s strict product liability
claims fail because pharmacists provide a service, not a product.87
The court dealt with each of these arguments in turn.
a. The learned intermediary rule and the policy of strict liability.
Ayerst Laboratories, and A.H. Robbins. See id. at 885.
81. Id. at 887.
82. See id.; see also In re Diet Drugs, No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12275
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000).
83. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 888.
86. See id. at 893–94.
87. Id.
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Siding with the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the
question,88 the court applied the learned intermediary rule to find
that the duty to warn patients of the dangers of prescription drugs
properly lies with the physician, not the pharmacist.89 In so finding,
the court relied on the reasoning set forth by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.90
In Coyle, the court first noted the special policy protections
afforded prescription drugs in comment k of § 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.91 The court then isolated four
pertinent factors in comment c of the Restatement “which support
the rule of strict product liability”:
(1) supplier liability makes a member of the marketing chain
available to the injured plaintiff for redress; (2) strict liability
provides an incentive to safety; (3) a supplier is in a better position
to prevent the circulation of the defective products; and (4) the
supplier can distribute the cost of compensating for injuries
resulting from defects by charging for it in his business.92

When it applied these factors to pharmacists, the Coyle court
found the policy reasons supporting application of strict liability to
pharmacists to be lacking.93 First of all, the court pointed out that “it
is not the pharmacist on whom the public ‘is forced to rely’ to obtain
the products they need.”94 Rather, the court said, it is the
“[p]hysicians [who] act as exclusive intermediaries.”95
Furthermore, the Coyle court found that “holding pharmacists to
strict liability [would not] serve as an incentive to safety, for the
pharmacist presented with a prescription ordered by a duly licensed
physician is not at liberty to substitute his judgment of the product’s
88. See supra Part II.A.
89. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
90. See id. at 894–95; see also Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387
(Pa. 1991) (holding that pharmacist had no strict liability duty to warn of the dangerous
effects of Bendectin).
91. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 894; supra Part II.A. See also Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1385.
The Coyle court first reprimanded the plaintiffs for basing their argument on § 402A,
explaining that the language of the Restatement is “not to be considered controlling.” Id. at
1384. Ironically, however, the court then reconciled its reliance on comment k of the same
section by pointing out that comment k had been incorporated by Pennsylvania case law. See
id.
92. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (quoting Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387).
93. See Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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safety for the patient for that of the physician.”96 The court sought
to balance the minimal effect such a duty could have on preventing
the circulation of defective products with patients’ need to acquire
drugs that are “necessary and appropriate for . . . their treatment,”
concluding that the needs of the public would be “ill-serve[d]” by
imposing a duty that would encourage pharmacists to refuse to fill a
physician-authorized prescription in an effort to avoid liability.97
In adopting the reasoning of the Coyle court, the Kohl court was
unconvinced by the plaintiff’s argument that pharmacists are better
able to distribute the cost of liability through insurance or
indemnification.98 Instead, the court found that “[r]eliance on costshifting . . . would result in absolute liability rather than strict
liability.”99 Based on the learned intermediary doctrine and the
underlying policies of strict liability, the Kohl court “decline[d] to
extend the rule of strict supplier liability to pharmacists.”100
b. Service vs. product. While the Kohl court based its strict liability
holding on the above rationale, the defendants advanced an
additional and entirely different argument; namely, that strict liability
is inapplicable to pharmacists because they provide a service rather
than a product.101 In support of this argument, the pharmacists
invoked an Arkansas statute providing that in order to prevail on a
strict liability claim, the plaintiff must prove: “(1) the defendant
pharmacies are engaged in the business of selling a product; (2) the
product was supplied in a defective condition which rendered it
unreasonably dangerous; and (3) the defective condition was a
proximate cause of the harm.”102 The pharmacists therefore
maintained that because they were not “engaged in the business of
selling a product,” but rather providing a service, the first prong of
the three-part test was not satisfied and the plaintiff’s claim must
fail.103
Despite the pharmacists’ attempt to distinguish services from
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
99. Id. (quoting Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387).
100. Id. (quoting Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1387).
101. See id. at 894.
102. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-86-102(a) (1996)). Utah law has similar
requirements for strict products liability. See, e.g., Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d
415, 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
103. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
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products, the Kohl court remained unconvinced. While the court
acknowledged that pharmacists do indeed provide a service, it also
found that it is indisputable that pharmacists’ “main function” is to
provide a product.104 Furthermore, the court was influenced by the
fact that “the [pharmacists’] service is not separately billed from the
product.”105 The court concluded that the defendants’ argument was
“rather shaky in the pharmacy context,” but that nevertheless the
learned intermediary rule precluded application of strict liability to
the pharmacists.106
C.

Negligence

While the Kohl court precluded application of strict liability to
pharmacists, it nevertheless found that a negligence claim against the
defendant pharmacies was cognizable based on the pharmacist’s
failure to “supply Kohl and/or her doctor” with the manufacturer’s
labeling information and because “the pharmacies knew, or should
have known, that the labeling information that was supplied was
inaccurate.”107
The court began by noting the current tension between the
traditional and modern views of pharmacist liability.108 Recognizing
that the question before it was one of first impression in Arkansas,
the court set out both sides of the argument in detail.109 In the end,
the court purported to side with the traditionalists in ruling that
“pharmacies generally have no common-law or statutory duty to
warn customers of the risks associated with the prescription drugs
they purchase.”110 The court was persuaded to adopt the traditional
view by the policies supporting the learned intermediary rule.111 For
example, the court pointed out that it would be “incongruous” to
hold a pharmacist to a duty to warn individual consumers when such
a duty is not even imposed on the manufacturer.112 Rather, such
warnings are provided “to the person who most needs and can best
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
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evaluate it—the physician—to be shared with and explained to the
patient in the context of his or her individual medical
circumstances.” 113
Despite the above language, the court maintained that the
defendant pharmacies could nevertheless be held liable in negligence
under Arkansas law.114 While the court declined to impose a
“generalized” duty to warn, it noted that pharmacists “must be held
to a duty to fill prescriptions as prescribed and properly label the
prescriptions.”115 Even though the court agreed that it would be
“incongruous” to hold pharmacists to higher duty than
manufacturers, the court still found that the defendant pharmacies
could have breached their duty by failing to supply warnings in
labeling information directly to the patient or her physician.116
Moreover, the court found that the defendant pharmacies could have
breached that duty by failing to question the adequacy of the
warnings117 supplied by the manufacturer.118
In short, the outcome in Kohl was surprising given the court’s
endorsement of the traditional view of pharmacist liability.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Strict Liability and Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs

1. The Kohl court correctly ruled that pharmacists should not be held
strictly liable for failure to warn
The Kohl court’s unwillingness to extend strict liability for failure
to warn to pharmacists is unsurprising, for with the exception of
patent prescription errors, virtually every court that has passed on the
question has also refused to impose such liability.119 While such
decisions suggest that the imposition of strict liability is not an
immediate threat to the pharmacist profession, it is worthwhile to
113. Id. (quoting Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1991)).
114. See id.
115. Id. Such language mirrors the language used to describe the traditional view of
clerical accuracy only. See, e.g., Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1386.
116. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
117. “Warning” and “labeling” are used interchangeably here. See supra note 16.
118. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
119. See, e.g., Griffith v. Blatt, 973 P.2d 385, 389–90 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
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emphasize the policies supporting these decisions, because the same
policies support the traditional view of pharmacists’ liability in
negligence.120 Specifically, the overwhelming authority agrees that
holding pharmacists to a strict liability duty to warn would (1)
undermine the patient-physician relationship, (2) jeopardize the
standard of patient care, and (3) ill serve the policies of strict
liability—to encourage safer products.121
2. Strict liability should not be applied to hold pharmacists liable in
other fenfluramine cases
Relatively few jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether
pharmacists should be held strictly liable for failure to warn of the
dangerous defects of prescriptions drugs,122 and the Kohl case is the
only case in the country to address these issues specifically in light of
fenfluramine. Therefore, it is helpful to examine the likely scenario
should one of the pending fenfluramine cases come before a court.
In Utah, for example, any strict products liability claim must
meet a three-prong test. The plaintiff must show: “(1) that the
product was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective
condition, (2) that the defect existed at the time the product was
sold, and (3) that the defective condition was a cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries.”123
In 1991, the Utah Supreme Court raised the bar for strict
liability actions pertaining to prescription drugs by holding that “all
FDA-approved prescription medications . . . [are] ‘unavoidably
unsafe.’”124 This meant that “a drug approved by the United States
Food and Drug Administration . . . , properly prepared,
compounded, packaged, and distributed, cannot as a matter of law
be ‘defective’ in the absence of proof of inaccurate, incomplete,

120. For example, that pharmacists should only be held liable in negligence under
exceptional circumstances.
121. See, e.g., Griffith, 973 P.2d at 389–90.
122. Even fewer of these decisions have come from western states. To date, the only
western states to consider the strict liability issue are California, Oregon, Washington, and
Arizona. See Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985); Griffith v. Blatt, 973
P.2d 385 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045 (Wash.
1989); Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
123. See Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993). See also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (1999).
124. Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991).
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misleading, or fraudulent information.”125 The 1991 holding was a
logical extension of the statutory language of the Utah Product
Liability Act, which provides that plaintiffs must overcome a
rebuttable presumption that the product is free from defects if
manufactured according to industry standards.126
When the above standards are applied to fenfluramine, it is
apparent that plaintiffs are fighting an uphill battle because
fenfluramine was FDA-approved until its official withdrawal on
September 15, 1997. Consequently, most plaintiffs point out that
while fenfluramine was FDA-approved, the combination of
fenfluramine with phentermine was not.127 This logic fails, however,
in light of the fact that, in the official news release of the withdrawal
of fenfluramine, the FDA specifically pointed out that phentermine
was not being withdrawn.128 It is therefore apparent that, according
to the FDA, it was not the “Fen-Phen” combination that was
dangerous, but the use of fenfluramine alone.129
The protection afforded prescription drugs by comment k130 and
legislative provisions like the Utah Product Liability Act lead most
plaintiffs to make the alternative argument that fenfluramine was
rendered unreasonably dangerous because of “inaccurate,
incomplete, misleading or fraudulent information.”131 These
allegations seem particularly inapplicable to fenfluramine, because it
is undisputed that even the FDA was unconvinced of the dangerous
propensities of the drug until its official withdrawal in September
1997. To hold pharmacists responsible for knowing something that
even the FDA did not know or acknowledge is highly suspect under
a negligence standard, and to hold pharmacists strictly liable for
125. Id.
126. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1999).
127. See, e.g., Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892 (W.D. Ark.
1999).
128. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1.
129. In its research supporting the withdrawal of fenfluramine, the FDA found the
existence of cardiac irregularities was no greater in patients taking the Fen-Phen combination
as in patients taking fenfluramine alone. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra
note 1. Moreover, while the FDA admonished those taking fenfluramine—either alone or in
the Fen-Phen combination—to “undergo a medical history and cardiovascular examination by
their physician,” it declined to comment on the use of phentermine alone, other than
acknowledging that phentermine had been FDA-approved since 1959 for the treatment of
obesity. Id.
130. For the text of comment k, see supra note 28.
131. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90; see also Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 890, 893.
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failing to provide such information directly to consumers borders on
the absurd.
Notwithstanding the absurdity of requiring pharmacists’
knowledge to exceed that of the FDA, holding pharmacists to strict
liability would also significantly undermine the physician-patient
relationship. In the typical fenfluramine scenario, a patient would
seek the medical advice of her physician for help losing weight. After
a consultation, the physician would prescribe the weight-loss drug to
be filled at the patient’s pharmacy. After this point, it would be
counterproductive for a pharmacist to second-guess the physician’s
orders or substitute her judgment for that of the physician. The
learned intermediary rule was implemented to prevent such a
situation. Under that well-accepted rule, “information about the
risks of medicines is provided to the person who most needs and can
best evaluate it—the physician—to be shared with and explained to
the patient in the context of his or her individual medical
circumstances.”132 Requiring pharmacists to evaluate independently
individual medical circumstances, such as a patient’s weight or eating
and exercise habits, would wreak havoc on the assignment of
responsibilities in the health care system.
Aside from the practical ramifications outlined above, requiring
pharmacists to exercise independent judgment would ill serve the
policy of strict liability—to encourage safer products. While holding
manufacturers strictly liable for failure to warn of the dangerous
propensities of their drugs that they knew or should have known may
prevent the circulation of defective products, such a standard would
be ineffective if applied to pharmacists. Pharmacists do not have the
means to conduct independent tests and research on drugs to
determine their dangerous effects. Instead, pharmacists might be left
with only one option to protect themselves: to refuse to fill
prescriptions “notwithstanding decisions by licensed physicians that a
particular drug was necessary and appropriate for their patients’
medical treatment.”133
In Kohl, the plaintiff urged the court to adopt the strict liability
standard in Arkansas because pharmacists are better able to distribute
the cost of liability through insurance or indemnification.134 While
such an argument may be applicable to a large pharmaceutical chain,
132. Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1991).
133. Id. at 1387.
134. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
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it lacks teeth when applied to the small neighborhood pharmacy.
Many of these pharmacies are family-owned and operated and lack
the resources to distribute the cost of the landslide of litigation
resulting from fenfluramine.
3. It is unhelpful to distinguish between “services” and “products” in the
strict liability context
While the pharmacists in Kohl were unsuccessful in convincing
the court that strict liability was inapplicable to them because they
provided a service and not a product, other defendant pharmacists
have had better luck with the theory. For example, in Murphy v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons,135 the California Supreme Court declined to apply
strict liability to pharmacists in part because it found that pharmacists
are “engaged in a hybrid enterprise.”136 The court pointed out that
“those who sell their services for the guidance of others . . . are not
liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct,”137 but
also acknowledged that “it cannot be disputed that a sale in fact
occurs.”138
However, the Murphy court also discussed the policy reasons that
prohibit application of strict liability to pharmacists. In addition to
those discussed above, the court was persuaded by a policy
consideration discussed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the
California State Board of Pharmacy: “in order to assure that a
pharmacy receives the maximum protection in the event of suit for
defects in a drug, the pharmacist may select the more expensive
product made by an established manufacturer” rather than a generic
brand.139
Because the Murphy court intermingled its policy discussion with
its distinction between products and services, it is difficult to
determine whether the “hybrid enterprise” argument standing on its
own would have been enough to save the defendant pharmacist from
strict liability. In any case, it is difficult to see the utility of such an
argument, because regardless of the pharmacists’ other duties, it is
undisputed that pharmacists are indeed in the business of selling

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 250 (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954)).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 253.
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products as required by state products liability statutory law.140 In the
end, the product vs. service argument is unnecessary because the
policies supporting the learned intermediary rule, combined with the
policies of the strict liability doctrine, are sufficient to preclude
application of strict liability to pharmacists.
B.

Negligence

1. The Kohl court adopted the traditional view in theory but the
modern view in practice
While the Kohl court adopted the traditional view in theory, the
court’s result reflected the modern view. Without doubt, the court
granted itself some leeway because it was merely required to decide
whether joinder of the two pharmacies was fraudulent.141 However,
because Kohl is the only case in the country so far to address the
issue of a pharmacist’s duty to warn of the dangerous effects of
fenfluramine, the court’s reasoning could have ramifications that
extend beyond the actual result.
a. The duty to warn vs. the duty to label. While the Kohl court
stated that it rejected a “general duty to warn customers of potential
drug side effects or to give advice on the efficacy of the drug absent
the presence of some contraindication,” it nevertheless agreed with
the plaintiff that a pharmacist could be held to a duty to supply the
manufacturer’s labeling information to the patient or her doctor and
to second-guess the manufacturer’s labeling information that it
“knew, or should have known” was inaccurate.142 Although such
language reveals the court’s attempt to distinguish between the duty
to warn and the duty to label, such a distinction is illogical in light of
the facts of Kohl.
The facts clearly demonstrate that Kohl contracted valvular heart
disease as a result of taking fenfluramine.143 Thus, Kohl sued the
pharmacy under the belief that her injury could have been prevented
had the pharmacy provided her with information about the risks of
fenfluramine.144 Regardless of whether the court requires pharmacists
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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to provide such information in warnings or labels, the court is still
asking the pharmacist to provide the patient or her doctor with
information the pharmacist did not know and had no reason to
know.145
While a valid distinction could be drawn between the duty to
warn and the duty to label in a theoretical sense,146 the circumstances
of Fen-Phen litigation suggest that, as long as the plaintiff alleges
heart-related injuries, the duty to warn and the duty to label will
remain synonymous because pharmacists had no reason to know of
such dangers until the FDA’s withdrawal of the drug.
Thus, semantic distinctions fail to change the heart of the matter:
despite the court’s pointed rejection of the modern view of
pharmacist liability, the suggestion that pharmacists are responsible
for the accuracy of manufacturers’ labeling information cannot be
reconciled with the traditional view the court purported to employ.
b. The learned intermediary rule and a pharmacist’s duty. Perhaps
the court’s most egregious inconsistency was its unqualified
endorsement of the learned intermediary rule while at the same time
validating the plaintiff’s allegations that (1) pharmacies have a duty
to supply individual consumers or their physicians with the
manufacturers’ labeling information, and (2) that pharmacies have a
duty to second-guess manufacturers’ labels that they “knew, or should
have known” were inaccurate.147 Such suggestions corrode the very
core of the learned intermediary doctrine. The court’s first
suggestion—that pharmacists may have a duty to supply individual
consumers with the manufacturer’s warnings—can be attacked on
many levels, not the least of which is practicality. In Leesley v. West,
the Illinois Court of Appeals pointed out that many drugs are
shipped to pharmacies in bulk from the drug manufacturer and
contain only a single package insert with labeling and/or warning
information.148 The court concluded that it would be
“unreasonable” to require a pharmacist to provide “every customer
whose prescription was filled from that bulk container with a copy of
the information contained in that single package insert.”149
145. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1.
146. For example, if Kohl sued the pharmacy because it failed to indicate dosage
instructions, the court could impose a duty to label without necessarily invoking a duty to
warn.
147. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
148. 518 N.E.2d 758, 761–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
149. Id. at 762.
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Even putting aside the practical arguments, requiring pharmacists
to pass on warning information to individual consumers is in excess
of what is required of manufacturers, who by law are required only
to warn physicians of the dangerous propensities of their drugs.150
The Leesley court called such a scheme “illogical,” “inequitable,” and
unduly burdensome.151 However, the burden on pharmacists is not
as disturbing as the disastrous effect such a scheme could have on
patient care—the very thing the learned intermediary rule was
designed to protect. The Leesley court pointed out that the reason
manufacturers are relieved of the duty to inform individual
consumers about the hazards of their products is not to protect the
manufacturers, but to protect the patients.152 Similarly, pharmacists
should not be required to warn individual consumers—not only
because such a duty is unduly burdensome, but also because it is the
physician, not the pharmacist or the manufacturer, who can best
evaluate and explain the dangers of prescription drugs “to the patient
in the context of his or her individual medical circumstances.”153
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that it would
be counterproductive for pharmacists to replicate the manufacturers’
package inserts for patients because such inserts are “written for the
physician, are detailed and technical, and may confuse and frighten
the patient.”154 It is thus perplexing that, while the Kohl court clearly
indicated that it felt bound to preserve the physician-patient
relationship,155 it fashioned a duty that would erode the very
relationship it sought to protect.
Along with suggesting pharmacists have a duty to pass along
manufacturers’ warnings to individual consumers, the court also
suggested that the defendant pharmacists have a duty to secondguess manufacturers’ warnings that they “knew, or should have
150. See id.
151. Id. It should be noted that in this section of the opinion the court was referring to
strict liability. However, in the next paragraph the court added, “Our conclusion with respect
to the negligence claim must ultimately be the same.” Id.
152. See id. at 761.
153. Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 893 (W.D. Ark. 1999)
(quoting Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1991)).
154. McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Wash. 1989). The court
also stated that “a requirement that consumers receive the manufacturer’s insert effectively
abrogates the learned intermediary doctrine and could impact not only pharmacists’ liability,
but that of manufacturers and physicians as well.” Id.
155. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
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known” were inaccurate.156 In the context of fenfluramine, it is easy
to see the injustice of such a position from a pharmacist’s
perspective: the court is suggesting that the pharmacists should have
known something that not only the FDA did not yet know, but that
the manufacturers did not know either.157
Furthermore, although the facts in Kohl are unclear as to what
information the pharmacy’s labels actually contained, it is evident
from the plaintiff’s complaint that she thought the pharmacy’s label
should have warned her of fenfluramine’s propensity for causing
heart disease.158 Of course, whether or not fenfluramine actually
causes heart disease is immaterial. The pertinent question is how
much, if anything, pharmacists are required to know about the
dangerous side effects of prescription drugs. Requiring them to
know anything outside of patent prescription errors creates a slippery
slope to limitless liability on the pharmacists’ side and substandard
patient care on the consumers’ side.
Unfortunately, the question of what a pharmacist’s duty exactly
entails is left open by the Kohl opinion. After the court stated that “a
generalized duty to warn is inappropriate given the role of the
physician in determining the appropriate drug to be prescribed,” it
went on to characterize the pharmacists’ duty as “a duty to fill
prescriptions as prescribed and properly label the prescriptions.”159
Not even the staunchest advocates of the traditional rule could find
fault with such a characterization of a pharmacist’s duty. However, if
the court believes its own language, it is difficult to see how the
above duty translates into passing on the manufacturer’s labeling
information to doctors or individual consumers and second-guessing
the manufacturer’s warnings.160
c. Exceptions to the clerical accuracy rule. One possible
explanation for this anomaly is that while the court perhaps aligned
itself with the traditional view in characterizing a pharmacist’s duty
as clerical accuracy only, the court also suggested the pharmacies in
Kohl breached that duty. However, this explanation fails under closer
156. Id.
157. Whether or not the manufacturers were actually unaware of fenfluramine’s potential
to cause heart disease is highly suspect. See In re Diet Drugs, No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12275 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000). However, the manufacturers’ actual knowledge of
this point is immaterial to the discussion at hand.
158. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 892.
159. Id. at 893.
160. See id.
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scrutiny. The authority is clear that the duty of clerical accuracy is
limited to correctly filling the prescription as written by the physician
and to be alert for patent prescription errors161 such as overdoses or
contraindications. Thus, not only does the Kohl court base its
holding upon the speculation that the pharmacies could have
breached their duty of clerical accuracy, it also seems to suggest that
the clerical accuracy duty itself should be expanded.
Another possible explanation is that the court thought the
pharmacy’s actions fit into one of the established exceptions to the
learned intermediary rule. The court peppered its opinion with
exceptions to the general rule that pharmacies have no duty to warn,
including “where there is evidence the pharmacy compounded . . .
or changed the drug in some manner after receiving it from the
manufacturer,”162 or in the presence of some “contraindication.”163
However, neither of the above permutations seem to fit within the
exception the court suggested: that pharmacists may have a duty to
supply consumers with the manufacturer’s label or second-guess the
content of such labels.164 Indeed, while there is ample authority to
support the view that the clerical accuracy rule has exceptions, none
of this authority extends the exceptions as far as the Kohl court
suggested.
For example, in McKee, the Washington Supreme Court limited
the patent prescriptions errors exception to “obvious lethal dosages,
inadequacies in the instructions, known contraindications, or
incompatible prescriptions.”165 In that case, the defendant pharmacy
dispensed weight-loss medications to the plaintiff as prescribed by
her physician.166 After taking the medication for over ten years, the
plaintiff subsequently became addicted to the drug and sued the
pharmacy in negligence and strict liability.167 The court found that
despite the plaintiff’s allegations, the pharmacy had fulfilled its duty
161. See, e.g., McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1052–53 (Wash.
1989).
162. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
163. Id. at 892.
164. See id. at 893.
165. McKee, 782 P.2d at 1053. It is worth noting that “inadequate instructions” should
not be confused with Kohl’s claim of “inaccurate labeling.” The former merely suggests the
patient was not informed of the correct dosage, while the latter suggests the pharmacists
should have warned the patient about side effects of the drug.
166. See id. at 1046–47.
167. See id. at 1047.
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“to be alert for clear errors or mistakes in the prescription,” holding
that such a duty did not extend to “warn[ing] customers of the
hazardous side effects associated with a drug, either orally or by way
of the manufacturer’s package insert.”168
Likewise, in Adkins v. Mong, the Michigan Court of Appeals
declined to find a patent prescription error when a pharmacy
dispensed over 116 narcotic prescriptions over a period of six years
to a patient who subsequently became addicted and sued the
pharmacy in negligence.169 The court held that the pharmacy’s duties
did not extend to warning the patient of the addictive propensities of
the narcotic.170
Thus, it seems clear that the Adkins and McKee courts would
disagree with the possible suggestion of the Kohl court—that the
duty to pass along manufacturers’ labeling information to consumers
and the duty to exercise independent judgment regarding such labels
should be incorporated as exceptions to the clerical accuracy rule.
d. State statutory provisions. Another possible way to reconcile the
Kohl court’s dicta with its holding is that it relied on the Arkansas
state statutory provisions to define the pharmacist’s duty. However,
the extent to which the court relied upon such provisions is unclear.
Initially, the court quoted the following provisions from the
Arkansas Code:
The “practice of pharmacy” means the learned profession of:
[i]nterpreting prescriptions for drugs, medicines, poisons, or
chemicals issued by practitioners authorized by law to prescribe
drugs, medicines, poisons, or chemicals which may be sold or
dispensed only on prescription . . .
[a]dvising and providing information concerning utilization of
drugs and devices and participation in drug utilization
reviews . . .
[p]roviding pharmacy care . . . . 171

Then, without further elaboration on the above provisions, the
court stated, “[g]iven the statutory provisions discussed172 above, we
168. Id. at 1055–56.
169. 425 N.W.2d, 151, 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
170. See id.
171. Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891 (W.D. Ark. 1999)
(quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-92-101(14)(A)(v), (viii), (x) (Supp. 1999)).
172. Despite the use of this word, the court in fact did not “discuss” the provisions of the
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disagree with the defendant manufacturers’ assessment of Arkansas
law and believe a cause of action against the pharmacies is
cognizable.”173 The court further held that “[w]hen faced with the
issue [of whether the pharmacies were fraudulently joined], we
believe Arkansas courts would hold that a pharmacy has a legal duty
to exercise due care and diligence in the performance of its
professional duties.”174 Therefore, the Kohl court suggested that the
above Arkansas statutory provisions could impose a duty on
pharmacies to pass a manufacturer’s warnings on to individual
consumers or provide such warnings to a patient’s physician, as well
as a duty to second-guess the accuracy of a manufacturer’s
warnings.175
Despite the Kohl court’s willingness to interpret the Arkansas
code as imposing a legal duty on pharmacists, some courts have
taken the opposite view. In McKee v. American Home Products, the
Washington Supreme Court declined to impose a duty to warn on
pharmacists based on the state’s “practice of pharmacy” statute.176
Despite the plaintiff’s contention that under the state statutory
provisions the pharmacy had a duty to warn her of the addictive
propensities of the weight-loss drug Plegine, the court determined
that the statute “is definitional and does not purport to set forth
duties.”177 The court then offered a conservative interpretation of
several of the statutory provisions. First, although the state statute
requires pharmacists “to orally explain the directions for use and give
any additional information necessary to assure proper use of the
drug,” the court interpreted this requirement to include
“nonjudgmental information, not affecting a decision to take or
continue using a drug, such as: whether to take the drugs on an
empty or full stomach, substances to avoid while using the drug, or
not to drive or use heavy machinery while taking the drug.”178
Arkansas Code at all. Instead, the court merely quoted the statutory provisions, then listed the
various allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint before concluding that the Arkansas Code
provided for consideration of plaintiff’s allegations. Id. at 891–92.
173. Id. at 892.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 892–93.
176. 782 P.2d 1045, 1051–52 (Wash. 1989). The Washington Act in McKee mirrored
the provisions of the Arkansas Act in Kohl. For the relevant provisions of the Washington Act,
see supra note 68.
177. McKee, 782 P.2d at 1052.
178. Id. at 1052 n.7.
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Secondly, although the state pharmacy act requires pharmacists
to maintain a record on each patient, the court recognized that “a
pharmacist typically does not have the patient’s complete medical
history and there may be occasions where the pharmacist is unaware
a drug is contraindicated.”179
If one takes the view that the Kohl court was attempting to
enforce the traditional view of pharmacist liability, both of the
McKee court’s observations should have been applied in Kohl.
Although the Kohl court neglected to specify which Arkansas
provisions in particular it relied on in its holding, the logical
conclusion is that it thought “[a]dvising and providing information
concerning utilization of drugs and devices”180 imposed a duty to
supply the consumer with the manufacturer’s warnings or inform the
consumer of inadequate information. Under the McKee analysis,
such a duty would require a pharmacist to exercise his independent
judgment and would therefore be inappropriate.
Moreover, although the Kohl court stated that a “general duty to
warn” is inappropriate “absent the presence of some
contraindication,”181 it neglected to temper such a statement with
the McKee court’s recognition that pharmacists have limited access to
patient information and cannot be responsible for every contraindication.182
In light of these observations, it should be noted that the Kohl
court did not admit that it was aligning itself with either the
traditional or the modern view. The fairest reading of the Kohl
opinion suggests that the court was attempting to make up its own
rule; while it agreed with the traditional view in theory, it was
uncomfortable with the unqualified suggestion that pharmacists have
no duty to warn. Therefore, the court tried to temper that rule with
its own exceptions.183 However, the court’s exceptions cut too far
into the substance of the traditional view, thereby enlarging the
potential scope of pharmacist liability and threatening patient care.
The section below outlines exceptions to the general rule that
pharmacists have no duty to warn, which exceptions can be
179. Id. at 1053 n.9.
180. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 891 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-92-101(14)(A)(v),
(viii), (x) (Supp. 1999)).
181. Id. at 892.
182. See McKee, 782 P.2d at 1052–53.
183. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
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employed without threatening patient care.
2. Negligence should be applied to pharmacists only in certain
circumstances
The principal argument of this Note is that pharmacist liability
should be limited in order to protect not only pharmacists, but also
patients and the health care system as a whole. However, even the
most conservative traditionalists agree that the general rule
prohibiting a duty to warn necessarily includes some exceptions.
a. Limited duty rule. The “limited duty” rule could also be
characterized as clerical accuracy tempered with exceptions.
Surprisingly,184 even the Kohl court accurately summarized the
generally recognized exceptions inherent in the limited duty rule.
Under this rule, liability could attach if
the pharmacist altered the product, . . . dispensed the wrong
drug, . . . knowingly dispensed a drug that was inferior or defective,
or had additional information about the plaintiff’s condition from
which a trier of fact could conclude a duty to warn existed and/or
a duty to inquire of the prescribing physician whether such drugs
were appropriate.185

Several cases have applied the limited duty rule while remaining
within the scope of the traditional view. However, the few cases that
have recognized such a duty are easily distinguished from the case at
hand. In Hand v. Krakowski, the Supreme Court of New York held
that the trial court had improperly granted summary judgment in the
defendant pharmacy’s favor.186 In that case, the pharmacy dispensed
728 units of psychotropic drugs to the plaintiff’s decedent, who was
an alcoholic.187 Because the pharmacy’s own records identified the
decedent as an alcoholic, and because the psychotropic drugs were
“commonly recognized to be contraindicated with alcoholism,” the
court held the pharmacy “may have had a duty to warn decedent of
the grave danger involved,” which precluded summary judgment.188
Similarly, in Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, the court affirmed
184. This is surprising because even though the court recognized these general
exceptions, it proceeded to add exceptions of its own to the general rule that a pharmacist has
no duty to warn.
185. Kohl, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
186. 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
187. See id.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
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judgment against the defendant pharmacy.189 In that case, plaintiff’s
physician prescribed rectal suppositories for the plaintiff’s migraine
headaches.190 The pharmacy dispensed the medication to the plaintiff
despite the fact that the physician’s prescription contained a clear
overdose and “patent inadequacies in the instructions.”191 The
pharmacy also refilled the prescription twice, even though the
physician had not authorized any refills.192 Both Hand and Riff are
readily distinguished from Kohl because they both involve the type of
patent prescription errors described in the “limited duty” rule.193
It is important to note that courts have conservatively construed
the exceptions in the limited duty rule. For example, the majority of
jurisdictions have held that even if the pharmacists had actual or
constructive knowledge of a drug’s dangerous side effects, the
pharmacists still had no duty to warn. For example, in Raynor v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., the court noted that “even assuming for
the purpose of this [summary judgment] motion that [the
pharmacy] knew Bendectin was teratogenic,194 it had no duty to
warn [the plaintiff].”195
Likewise in Leesley v. West, the court held the defendant
pharmacy was under no duty to warn the plaintiff of peptic
ulceration and gastrointestinal bleeding, even though such incidents
were “known . . . side effects of Feldene.”196 The Leesley and Raynor
decisions emphasize the futility of trying to determine what the
pharmacists “knew, or should have known” as applied to the duty to
warn. While the modern view advocates a case-by-case analysis to
determine whether a pharmacist “knew, or should have known” of
the dangerous effects of a drug it prescribed, the traditional view
recognizes that even in those situations where a pharmacist actually
knew of the dangerous side effects of a given drug, those side effects
should be properly discussed with the patient by her physician and
not the pharmacist. Furthermore, as the McKee court recognized, a
patient’s full medical record is often unavailable to the pharmacist,
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

508 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
See id. at 1249.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1250.
See McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1053 (Wash. 1989).
Causing infants to be born with malformed limbs.
643 F. Supp. 238, 246–47 (D.D.C. 1986).
518 N.E.2d 758, 760 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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therefore creating a risk of inaccurate or incomplete advice.197 The
very purpose of the learned intermediary rule is to bypass the
difficulties, inequities, and dangers of imputing knowledge to a
pharmacist.
b. The limited duty rule and fenfluramine. Under the reasoning
of Raynor and Leesley, the Kohl decision clearly expands the scope of
the limited duty rule to an unacceptable extent. When the Kohl court
suggested that a pharmacist may have a duty to question a
manufacturer’s warnings that it “knew, or should have known” were
inaccurate,198 what it really suggested was that pharmacists have a
duty to independently warn consumers if the pharmacists “knew, or
should have known” that fenfluramine caused heart disease.
Even under a liberal reading of the limited duty rule, it is difficult
to see how a pharmacist should be held responsible for the
dangerous side effects of fenfluramine that were not made known by
the FDA. Such a suggestion would imply that even a neighborhood
pharmacist has means of testing and research at his disposal that
surpass one of the government’s largest administrative agencies.
Moreover, a conservative reading of the limited duty rule would
recognize that whether or not fenfluramine really does cause heart
disease is immaterial, for even assuming a pharmacy knew of the
dangerous side effects of the drug, a pharmacist should still be
protected under the learned intermediary rule.
The pharmacy in Kohl did none of the things that would qualify
as an exception under the limited duty rule as it is generally
understood. Specifically, it did not “alter[] the product, or
dispense[] the wrong drug,”199 and it could not have known that
fenfluramine was “inferior or defective”200 until after the FDA’s
withdrawal. Furthermore, the pharmacist did not have “additional
information”201 about the plaintiff’s particular condition within the
meaning of Hand v. Krakowski 202 that would require it to “inquire
of the prescribing physician whether such drugs were appropriate.”203
While the fact that the Kohl court was merely trying to determine
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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whether joinder of the defendant pharmacies was fraudulent
prohibits the case from being the smoking gun that it otherwise
might have been, the opinion could still be dangerous when read for
all it is worth. The court’s analysis cannot be cabined in traditional,
modern, or limited duty doctrines. As such, it is something of a loose
cannon that could be interpreted to expand pharmacist liability to an
unacceptable extent and thereby endanger patient care.
V.

CONCLUSION

The traditional view, tempered with the exceptions of the limited
duty rule, is the best mechanism to protect the values fostered under
the learned intermediary rule. In contrast, the modern view
endangers patient care, undermines the learned intermediary rule,
and threatens to supplant the physician’s role in the health care
system with that of the pharmacist, who is ill-equipped for such
responsibility. The court’s opinion in Kohl, while paying lip service
to the traditional view, encourages an expansive view of pharmacist
liability without taking responsibility for the implications. If the Kohl
opinion is followed, pharmacists likely will not survive the Fen-Phen
feeding frenzy.
Karina Fox
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